Atorni: August 2012

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VITUG vs. RONGCAL (A.C. No. 6313 09/07/2006)

FACTS: Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to her by her former classmate. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the said affidavit. On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal checkin the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga

Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent be disbarred for immorality

(2) Whether or not respondent’s act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code.

HELD:

(1) NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. On sexual relation and on respondent’s subsequent marriage, by his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage, complainant’s allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.

(2) NO. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough in the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.

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CATU vs. RELLOSA (A.C. No. 5738 02/19/2008)

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5^th District of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oathand/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

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DACANAY vs. BAKER & MC KENZIE (A.C. No. 2131 05/10/1985)

FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his purpose of using the letterhead of another law office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

HELD: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

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PEOPLE vs. TUANDA (A.M. No. 3360 01/30/1990)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

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TOLEDO vs. ABALOS (A.C. No. 5141 09/29/1999)

FACTS: This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back. Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. Respondent executed a Promissory Note to guarantee the payment of said obligation. Respondent failed to pay her obligation despite repeated demands of the complainant. Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline. Although, the respondent received an order from the Commission, she did not do anything about it. The Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the practice of law of respondent for a period of six months “for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has jurisdiction to suspend Atty. Abalos.

HELD: YES. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. The recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of , i.e., her failure to appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. IBP does not ignore the fact that by virtue of one’s membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution.

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IN RE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (49 SCRA 22 01/09/1973)

FACTS: The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. Arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. The Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar.

(2) Whether or not the integration of the Bar be constitution.

(3) Whether or not the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time.

HELD:

(1) YES. The Court may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

(2) YES. The Court quotes discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.

(3) YES. In the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. The national poll conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar shows that 96.45% voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 2.51% against it. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

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NUNGA vs. VIRAY (A.C. No. 4758 04/30/1999)

FACTS: Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed. . After issues were joined, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation. The report showed that respondent Viray notarized a deed of absolute sale when he was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. Respondent alleged that from 1965 to date he was always commissioned as notary public. . According to respondent, there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. He further explained that in the alleged documents, he had PTR for that purpose and therefore, he would not have obtained a commission without the PTR. The Undersigned noted after going over the records of the case that although both parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a], only complainant complied with the order.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s act is a valid ground for disbarment.

HELD: YES. Notarization is invested with public interest because it converts a private document into a public one, making such documents admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. Notarizing without commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws (the Notarial Law) and by making it appear that he is so authorized is a deliberate falsehood which violates the lawyer’s oath and of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years.

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ARRIETA vs. LLOSA (A.C. No. 4369 11/28/1997)

FACTS: A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Llosa by Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were already dead prior to its execution. In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the identities of the signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its execution.

However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact the instant case is only a product of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order. The designated Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended the dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the above recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of law.

HELD: YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six months from practice of law with a warning that another infraction will be dealt with more severely. Citing Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 also known as the Notarial law, the Supreme Court explained the importance of adherence to said law as part of the responsibility of a duly deputized authority to conduct such notarial process. Due diligence is to be observed, this being part of a lawyers professional responsibility and procedural lapse is not an excuse to cater to the convenience of clients. Any violation is tantamount to misconduct. Such misconduct is a ground for disbarment as stated by the Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed the primary responsibility of lawyers as stated in Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. A lawyer must also refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity may be disbarred or suspended.

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ZALDIVAR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (166 SCRA 316 10/071988)

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. It is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

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QUINGWA vs. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

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Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA (181 SCRA 367 01/23/1990)

FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. During the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.

Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee.

2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:

1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."

2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorney’s fees.

3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are:

(1) the importance of the subject matter in controvers
(2) the extent of the services rendered, and

(3) the professional standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is hereby

REVERSED and SET.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.

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QUIRANTE vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R No. 73886)

FACTS: On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as follows:

a. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.

b. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.

ISSUE: Whether or not Quirante could claim attorney’s fees.

HELD: NO. An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.

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SURIGAO MINERAL VS. CLORIBEL (31 SCRA 1 01/09/1970)

FACTS:

First Contempt Case. The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International Minerals Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John Beltran Sotto made use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like "it seems many of our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face" and insinuating favoritism and partisanship of the members of the Court, notable Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro due to alleged interest in the case (Castro's brother works for one of the parties). Santiago and Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the MR. The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for the said statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were inadvertently included in the copy sent to the Court, and was just intended to be in the MR's rough draft.

Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained language which the Court found disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of town when the decision was written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of graft and corruption in the judiciary. The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that it the motion was already prepared by Santiago when he took the case as was verified by Morton Meads, an employee from MacArthur.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be cited in contempt?

HELD:

First Contempt Case. Yes. The language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the administration of justice which trangresses Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the RoC which states that "a lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". They are also expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers but their acts resulted in the contrary and are intended to create and atmosphere of distrust. The inadvertence of Santiago's use of words can't be used as a shield to absolve him of any misdeeds.

Second Contempt Case. Yes. Even if the idea of the language used in the 4th MR came from Meads, both Santiago and Caling should've adhered to Canon 16 of the Code of Legal Ethics wherein "a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which a lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminated their relation". Santiago is also liable here since Caling's represent didn't divest him of his capacity as counsel for MacArthur.

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BELTRAN JR. VS. ABAD (132 SCRA 453 10/11/1984)

FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury. The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with the respondent.

Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.

ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.

Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.

HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without license. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing. A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

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NARAG VS. NARAG (291 SCRA 451 06/29/1998)

FACTS: Atty. Narag’s spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred.

HELD: Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards

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RAMOS VS. MAÑALAC (89 PHIL 270 06/16/1951)

FACTS: The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on therefore said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge the service in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August 9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes final. The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest bidder and the provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion was granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order.

ISSUES: Whether or not the order of the court dated September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgage.

Whether or not the decision rendered by the lower court on August 24, 1939 in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question is valid.

HELD: The second issue raised by the petitioner is not also taken, for the simple reason that the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the Court can undertake even after the lapses of five (5) years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of the third persons have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil. 201). This is the correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their possession.

The Court is of the opinion that the claim of the petitioners can not be sustained for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attach to a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717)

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