FACTS:
Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the
Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman,
having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took
her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea
for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not
because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual
passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true
copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the
respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to
the respondent whenever he asked from her.
The
respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds
for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.
HELD:
YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is
that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet
the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all
times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the
respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations
in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of
the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The
inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times
without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of court states that:
A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has
committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer
should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain
the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and,
as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
